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JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-2-2(3)0). Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4),
this matter was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme
Court, dated July 6, 2006, and effective July 26, 2006.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL

1.

Issue: Does defendant's affidavit raise a genuine issue of material fact

as to plaintiffs entitlement to relief, with respect to the claim or any defense thereto,
such that the trial court erred when it granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment?1
Standard of Review: "Because the propriety o f . . . a summary judgment
. . . presents questions of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's
determinations and review the issues under a correctness standard." Harmon City, Inc.
v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995). "We review the trial court's
summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial court correctly
applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact
existed." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, at 1J10, 48 P.3d 235, 238. "Summary
judgment is appropriate only 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.' When we review a grant of summary judgment, 'we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.'" Id. at 239 (citations omitted).

1

This issue subsumes and includes all possible subsidiary issues.

1

APPLICABLE STATUTES A N D RULES
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56:

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages
or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

The judgment appealed from was entered upon a summary judgment of liability
and damages for a debt alleged to be owing from defendant to plaintiff upon a
promissory note.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Plaintiff/appellee filed suit to recover sums he alleged were owing to him by
appellant individually. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the

2

trial court in a Ruling and Order, dated January 10, 2006. R. 309-318. Before
judgment was entered, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint,
which was opposed by the plaintiff. R. 325-329.
On January 24, 2006, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff, while the motion
for leave to file a third-party complaint was pending. R. 340-342. June 2, 2006, the trial
court entered its order granting the motion to allow a third party complaint and entering
findings under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 54(b) to make its January 19, 2006 Judgment entered on

summary judgment final. Before such findings were entered, appellant had filed a
Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2006, which appeal was pending before the Utah
Court of Appeals as Case No. 20060177CA. R. 397-400.
On June 29, 2006, defendant filed his notice of appeal with respect to the trial
court's June 2, 2006 Ruling and Order, which was assigned Case No. 20060614.
On July 31, 2006, this Court entered its order consolidating the appeals.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, but the third-party
complaint of the defendant has not been dismissed. Proceedings are being held in
abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Defendant and Appellant Nielsen resides in Summit County, Utah and is

the managing member of an entity known as The Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company ("The Ridge"), which is the successor in interest to an entity
known as Nielsen Redhawk, LLC ("NR").

Affidavit of Michael Nielsen ("Nielsen Aff.")

at U 1, R. 54-55. Although plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was directed strictly
to the terms of a specific note, whether liability currently exists on such note involves
3

not simply the loan in question, but an entire partnership relationship between entities
owned by the parties relating to a large real estate development in Summit County, the
dissolution of which has already been the subject of an arbitration award. Id.
2.

The plaintiff in this action, Kirkpatrick MacDonald ("MacDonald"), is a

partner in MacDonald Redhawk Investors ("MRI"), a New York general partnership and
a member in Redhawk Development Company, LLC ("RDC"), a Utah limited liability
company, both of which are MacDonalds in another action in the Third District Court,
Summit County, State of Utah, against The Ridge, Nielsen, Redhawk Management,
LLC ("RM") and NR, as defendants, assigned Case No. 050500229. In that action, MRI
and RDC seek to "quiet title" to real property that has been divided by virtue of an
arbitration award dissolving RDC (the "Award"), which award was entered by a panel of
three American Arbitration Association arbitrators (the "Panel"), after an arbitration in
which the Panel first calculated Nielsen's and MacDonald's equity interests in RDC.
MacDonald, himself characterized his personal involvement in RDC, in "Claimant's
Arbitration Brief," a genuine copy of which is attached to the affidavit of the defendant
as Exhibit "A": "Kirk MacDonald through MacDonald Redhawk Investors, LLC
(MacDonald RH) has invested $4,894,000 in the Project since May 1997

" Nielsen

Aff. at H 2, R. 55 and Nielsen Aff. Exhibit A, R. 63 and R. 92-94.
3.

MacDonald, himself, characterized one of the "realities" of the arbitration

proceeding to be: "Mr. MacDonald's dire need and right to protect his investment." R.
63.
4.

MacDonald, himself, noted for the arbitrators as a material point in the

proceeding before them: "Mike Nielsen, alone has derived $2,557,426.69 in direct
economic benefits from the Redhawk project ($250K in cash payments; $1,830,763.50
4

in property retained; and over $476K in proceeds from a financing with the Beehive
Credit Union)." R. 63, n. 1.
5.

The entire arbitration proceeding went forward, by mutual agreement

between defendant and MacDonald, to analyze their individual positions in RDC with
respect to the assets and liabilities of RDC and how to divide the Project between them,
using their respective entities as investment vehicles. Nielsen Aff. at jf 5, R. 56.
6.

After the Panel decided that RDC should be dissolved and the property

partitioned between The Ridge and MacDonald, the Panel asked each party to make a
"baseball" arbitration proposal, for the purpose of fairly dividing all assets and liabilities
of RDC between them. Defendant's "baseball" proposal was adopted by the arbitrators
as the fairest split between the parties, based on all the financial considerations of RDC
and the parties' equity interests in RDC. Nielsen Aff. at U 7, R. 56.
7.

When defendant prepared the "baseball" proposal he submitted and the

Panel adopted, defendant did so with the understanding and intent, as expressed by
MacDonald in Claimant's Arbitration Brief, that the final award would resolve all financial
considerations of RDC and divide between MacDonald and defendant all of the assets
and liabilities. One of the liabilities that defendant specifically took into account in
defendant's mind when making the baseball proposal adopted by the Panel was the
very loan at issue in this case. While the complaint herein and motion for summary
judgment attempt to make it appear as though defendant received the money,
personally, that is not true. Nielsen Aff. at ff 8, R. 56-57. Every penny of the loan was
intended to be spent for, and was spent for, the purpose of paying debts for the Project,
to the benefit of RDC. The document reflecting the loan specifically references the
intended purpose of the loan to pay Project vendors: "At your request, in order to see
5

that local or long overdue invoices are paid, I have today wired your Red Hawk Ranch
account at Zions the sum of $60,000.00. I understand that Messrs. Gaskill and Gillette
have also advanced $60,000.00 toward local vendor payables." Id. and Exhibit 1 to
MacDonald Affidavit filed in support of motion for summary judgment, R. 30.
8.

At the time that loan was made, there was a bitter dispute ongoing

between MacDonald and another partner, Mr. Gaskill. MacDonald told defendant that
MacDonald did not want to make the loan to RDC so long as Mr. Gaskill was a partner,
so MacDonald asked defendant to sign personally, but with the understanding that
defendant, then, would advance the funds to the benefit of RDC, thereby creating a
creditor relationship with RDC. Nielsen Aff. at If 9, R. 57. The loan specifically
contemplated that it would be reworked when Mr. Gaskill was gone, by its language:
"We may eventually recast it in some other manner depending on how things develop."
Mr. Gaskill in fact left, but then differences developed between MacDonald and
defendant. Id. and Exhibit 1 to MacDonald Affidavit, R. 32.
9.

The loan was never an issue until the arbitration proceeding. Defendant

in fact does not recall ever receiving the unsigned letter, dated July 13, 1999, attached
as Exhibit 2 to MacDonald's affidavit, and believes that he did not receive it. Nielsen
Aff. at 1110, R. 57-58. Defendant did, however, learn through e-mails received in the
arbitration, that MacDonald during that time period was scheming with his lawyers and
others about ways to eliminate defendant's interest in RDC. R. 142-244. Defendant
therefore infers that the letter now attached to MacDonald's affidavit may have been
one of the proposed schemes, but that instead of going forward on that route, in light of
Mr. Gaskill being gone and the prior understanding defendant had with MacDonald
about redoing the loan when Mr. Gaskill was gone, that MacDonald and his attorney
6

elected instead to go forward with an arbitration to dissolve RDC. Nielsen Aff. at U 10,
R. 58.
10.

That inference is reinforced by the fact that MacDonald caused a

Complaint to be filed in Third District Court, the following month, on August 30, 1999,
seeking an order to compel an arbitration over dissolution of RDC to be completed no
later than November 1, 1999, for the pleaded purpose of allowing "disputes within [RDC
to] be resolved sufficiently before January, 2000 to allow each Member adequate time
to negotiate settlements with the creditors with claims against the portions of the
Property that each Member receives through binding arbitration." R. 245-250. From
that point forward, the statements of MacDonald made clear that all issues surrounding
RDC were to be resolved through the arbitral dissolution. This would include the loan at
issue in this case, which would be paid from the RDC dissolution, since it was a debt
incurred by RDC to me, to be repaid to MacDonald. Nielsen Aff. at fl 11, R. 58-59.
11.

The monies advanced to RDC pursuant to that loan should have been,

and defendant believes were, booked as liabilities of RDC and thus, even pursuant to
the Arthur Andersen report prepared for MacDonald, would have been taken into
account by the Panel in its equity determination, as it was taken into account by
defendant in determining the reasonableness of the "baseball" proposal defendant
made that was adopted by the Panel as the Award. Nielsen Aff. at fl 12, R. 59.
12.

The Panel's Award contains no written explanation of its reasoning. The

Panel did agree to meet with the parties about the Award, and such a meeting took
place in the office of James R. Holbrook, shortly after the Award was issued.
Defendant recalls that, present at that meeting on defendant's behalf were defendant,
Steve Ross, who was defendant's project manager, and Robert Stoelbarger, who was
7

defendant's lawyer, on behalf of MacDonald were MacDonald, a brother of MacDonald,
Steve Wood, who was MacDonald's California lawyer, Thomas Billings, who was
MacDonald's Utah lawyer and the three arbitrators, James R. Holbrook, Alan Funk and
Philip Cook. During Mr. Holbrook's explanation of the Panel's reasoning and intent, Mr.
Wood said: "What about my client's $60,000 personal loan to Nielsen?" Mr. Holbrook
responded by clarifying the Panel's intent in handling the loan: "That was included in the
40/60 split [of equity]." Nielsen Aff. at fl 14, R. 59-60.
13.

Defendant understood MacDonald to have agreed that the loan subject of

this action was part and parcel of the arbitration, MacDonald's conduct in the arbitration
and his lawyer's question to the Panel evidenced MacDonald's own knowledge that
such loan had been accounted for in the dissolution of RDC and defendant relied on
the impression that defendant received from MacDonald during the entirety of the
arbitration proceeding that such loan was being resolved as part of the dissolution when
defendant formulated and proposed the "baseball" arbitration proposal that was
adopted by the Panel as their Award. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

MacDonald persuaded the trial court that the controversy presented for
resolution involved one simple transaction. The trial court ignored the long and
complex relationship between the parties, of which the transaction at issue was only
one component, while acknowledging that the documents upon which the plaintiff relied
referred to those other transactions and relationships. Ruling and Order, R. 365.
On summary judgment, the facts pleaded in defendant's affidavit, and the
attachments thereto, must be considered as true and, if true, those facts effectively
demonstrate material issues as to whether the obligation was intended by the parties to
8

be an individual obligation of defendant, whether the form of the transaction was to
have been "recast" upon the exit of one of the partners and, indeed, whether the
obligation was intended to have been included in the final arbitration award entered
which was to have resolved the disputes between the parties.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPLICABLE STANDARD?

A lower court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is reviewed for
correctness. ""Because a summary judgment presents questions of law, we accord no
particular deference to the court of appeals' ruling and review it for correctness."
Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, H 8, 137 P.3d 779, 782. "A trial court's grant or denial of
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness." Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, fl 9, 998
P.2d 262, 265. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 2001 UT 54,
H 9, 28 P.3d 669, 673 (citing

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "Doubts, uncertainties or

inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases
fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious
from the evidence before the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no
right to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility."
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted). See also

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56.

"[A]ll undisputed material facts [must be considered] in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party . . . ." (IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 2003
9

UT 5, If 6, 73 P.3d 320, 323), and"all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [must be
viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[,]" {Alder v. Bayer Corp.,
2002 UT 115, U 25, 61 P.3d 1068, 1076). A single sworn statement of fact on a
material question of fact is sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. See
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (" 'A
single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact.'") (quoting Webster v.
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)).

II.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED W H E N IT HELD THERE W E R E N O GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT IN ITS ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The "Note" on which this action is based consists in fact of a letter from
MacDonald, (who is now the putative assignee of MRI), to Nielsen. R.6. In its summary
judgment ruling, the trial court stated: "On its face a portion of this letter agreement is
clear, but as a whole it is less clear." R.315. "As a whole" is, of course, how contracts
must be construed. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982)(courts
"look[ ] at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole."). Nevertheless, the
trial court found the Note unambiguous.2 Id. This finding was in error. The trial court's
determination that the Note was unambiguous is a question of law. Interwest

2

The trial court made no finding as to integration. Yet there is no question, under Utah
law, that the determination of whether a document was intended to be an integration is
a question of fact, not law. See Tates, Inc. v. Salisbury, 795 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("Whether a particular expression is an integration of the contract is a
question of fact, and evidence both within and without the claimed integration is
admissible to determine whether it is indeed an integration.") As the language of the
Note, itself, and the Affidavit of C. Michael Nielsen shows, there was an understanding
about when and under what circumstances the Note would be "recast" from a personal
obligation of Nielsen to an RDC obligation. Thus, the Note could not qualify as an
integration, or at least a fact issue is raised on that issue.

10

Construction v. Homer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996) ("[determining whether a
contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question of law"); Equitable Life & Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("whether a contract is
ambiguous is itself a question of law") (quoting Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am.
Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (1988)). Thus, this Court "accord[s] a trial court's
interpretation of a contract no deference and review[s] it for correctness." Aquagen
Intl., Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). The Note stated: "in order to
see that local vendors' long overdue invoices are paid, I have today wired to your Red
Hawk Ranch account at Zions the sum of $60,000." R.6 The Note further states: "We
may eventually recast it in some other manner, depending on how things develop." Id.
The Note, itself, does not say when or under what conditions the obligation would be
recast, and so is plainly ambiguous.
The Affidavit of C. Michael Nielsen sets forth facts explaining that Mr. Gaskill's
presence as an RDC partner was the reason that MacDonald wanted the loan to be
originally "personal" to Nielsen. R.57. The fact that the Note talks about "recasting"
the obligation "depending on how things develop," plainly raised an issue about whether
the "things developing" would be the departure of Mr. Gaskill, which in fact occurred.
See R.57. Mr. Nielsen's understanding was that the recasting was to take place upon
Mr. Gaskill's departure. R. 58. That Nielsen in fact had that understanding and treated
the obligation as "recast" is further shown by the fact that he included the obligation in
the Baseball Arbitration Proposal he drafted. R. 56-57. MacDonald's credibility in
denying such intent to recast is brought into question by his hidden motivation to
remove Nielsen from RDC R. 57-58.
Further, the affidavit sets forth a full factual context from which many inferences
11

favorable to Mr. Nielsen may be derived. Mr. Nielsen is the managing member of The
Ridge, which is the successor in interest to an entity known as Nielsen Redhawk, LLC.
R. 54-55. Although plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was directed strictly to the
terms of a specific note, whether liability currently exists on such note involves not
simply the loan in question, but an entire partnership relationship between entities
owned by the parties relating to a large real estate development in Summit County, the
dissolution of which has already been the subject of an arbitration award. Id.
MacDonald is a partner in MacDonald Redhawk Investors ("MRI"), a New York
general partnership which is member in RDC, a Utah limited liability company, both of
which are MacDonald's entities and parties in another action in the Third District Court,
Summit County, State of Utah, against The Ridge, Nielsen, Redhawk Management,
LLC ("RM") and NR, as defendants, assigned Case No. 050500229. In that action, MRI
and RDC seek to "quiet title" to real property that has been divided by virtue of an
arbitration award dissolving RDC (the "Award"), which award was entered by a panel of
three American Arbitration Association arbitrators (the "Panel"), after an arbitration in
which the Panel first calculated Nielsen's and MacDonald's equity interests in RDC.
MacDonald, himself characterized his personal involvement in RDC, in "Claimant's
Arbitration Brief," a genuine copy of which is attached to the affidavit of the defendant
as Exhibit "A": "Kirk MacDonald through MacDonald Redhawk Investors, LLC
(MacDonald RH) has invested $4,894,000 in the Project since May 1997

" Nielsen

Aff. at U 2, R. 55 and Nielsen Aff. Exhibit A, R. 63 and R. 92-94.
MacDonald, himself, characterized one of the "realities" of the arbitration
proceeding to be: "Mr. MacDonald's dire need and right to protect his investment." R.
63. MacDonald, himself, noted for the arbitrators as a material point in the proceeding
12

before them: "Mike Nielsen, alone has derived $2,557,426.69 in direct economic
benefits from the Redhawk project ($250K in cash payments; $1,830,763.50 in property
retained; and over $476K in proceeds from a financing with the Beehive Credit Union)."
R. 63, n. 1. The entire arbitration proceeding went forward, by mutual agreement
between Mr. Nielsen and MacDonaid, to analyze their individual positions in RDC with
respect to the assets and liabilities of RDC and how to divide the Project between them,
using their respective entities as investment vehicles. Nielsen Aff. at |[ 5, R. 56. After
the Panel decided that RDC should be dissolved and the property partitioned between
The Ridge and MacDonaid, the Panel asked each party to make a "baseball" arbitration
proposal, for the purpose of fairly dividing all assets and liabilities of RDC between
them. Mr. Nielsen's "baseball" proposal was adopted by the arbitrators as the fairest
split between the parties, based on all the financial considerations of RDC and the
parties' equity interests in RDC. Nielsen Aff. at fl 7, R. 56. When Mr. Nielsen prepared
the "baseball" proposal he submitted and the Panel adopted, Mr. Nielsen did so with the
understanding and intent, as expressed by MacDonaid in Claimant's Arbitration Brief,
that the final award would resolve all financial considerations of RDC and divide
between MacDonaid and Mr. Nielsen all of the assets and liabilities.
One of the liabilities that Mr. Nielsen specifically took into account in Mr.
Nielsen's mind when making the baseball proposal adopted by the Panel was the very
loan at issue in this case. While the complaint herein and motion for summary
judgment attempt to make it appear as though Mr. Nielsen received the money,
personally, that is not true. Nielsen Aff. at U 8, R. 56-57. Every penny of the loan was
intended to be spent for, and was spent for, the purpose of paying debts for the Project,
to the benefit of RDC. The document reflecting the loan specifically references the

13

intended purpose of the loan to pay Project vendors: "At your request, in order to see
that local or long overdue invoices are paid, I have today wired your Red Hawk Ranch
account at Zions the sum of $60,000.00. I understand that Messrs. Gaskill and Gillette
have also advanced $60,000.00 toward local vendor payables." Id. and Exhibit 1 to
MacDonald Affidavit filed in support of motion for summary judgment, R. 30.
At the time that loan was made, there was a bitter dispute ongoing between
MacDonald and another partner, Mr. Gaskill. MacDonald told Mr. Nielsen that
MacDonald did not want to make the loan to RDC so long as Mr. Gaskill was a partner,
so MacDonald asked Mr. Nielsen to sign personally, but with the understanding that Mr.
Nielsen, then, would advance the funds to the benefit of RDC, thereby creating a
creditor relationship with RDC. Nielsen Aff. at fl 9, R. 57. The loan specifically
contemplated that it would be reworked when Mr. Gaskill was gone, by its language:
"We may eventually recast it in some other manner depending on how things develop."
Mr. Gaskill in fact left, but then differences developed between MacDonald and Mr.
Nielsen. Id. and Exhibit 1 to MacDonald Affidavit, R. 32.
The loan was never an issue until the arbitration proceeding. Mr. Nielsen in fact
does not recall ever receiving the unsigned letter, dated July 13, 1999, attached as
Exhibit 2 to MacDonald's affidavit, and believes that he did not receive it. Nielsen Aff.
atU 10, R. 57-58. Mr. Nielsen did, however, learn through e-mails received in the
arbitration, that MacDonald during that time period was scheming with his lawyers and
others about ways to eliminate Mr. Nielsen's interest in RDC. R. 142-244. Mr. Nielsen
therefore infers that the letter now attached to MacDonald's affidavit may have been
one of the proposed schemes, but that instead of going forward on that route, in light of
Mr. Gaskill being gone and the prior understanding Mr. Nielsen had with MacDonald
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about redoing the loan when Mr. Gaskill was gone, that MacDonald and his attorney
elected instead to go forward with an arbitration to dissolve RDC. Nielsen Aff. at U 10,
R. 58.
That inference is reinforced by the fact that MacDonald caused a Complaint to
be filed in Third District Court, the following month, on August 30, 1999, seeking an
order to compel an arbitration over dissolution of RDC to be completed no later than
November 1, 1999, for the pleaded purpose of allowing "disputes within [RDC to] be
resolved sufficiently before January, 2000 to allow each Member adequate time to
negotiate settlements with the creditors with claims against the portions of the Property
that each Member receives through binding arbitration." R. 245-250. From that point
forward, the statements of MacDonald made clear that all issues surrounding RDC
were to be resolved through the arbitral dissolution. This would include the loan at
issue in this case, which would be paid from the RDC dissolution, since it was a debt
incurred by RDC to me, to be repaid to MacDonald. Nielsen Aff. at U 11, R. 58-59.
The monies advanced to RDC pursuant to that loan should have been, and Mr.
Nielsen believes were, booked as liabilities of RDC and thus, even pursuant to the
Arthur Andersen report prepared for MacDonald, would have been taken into account
by the Panel in its equity determination, as it was taken into account by Mr. Nielsen in
determining the reasonableness of the "baseball" proposal Mr. Nielsen made that was
adopted by the Panel as the Award. Nielsen Aff. at U 12, R. 59.
The Panel's Award contains no written explanation of its reasoning. The Panel
did agree to meet with the parties about the Award, and such a meeting took place in
the office of James R. Holbrook, shortly after the Award was issued. Mr. Nielsen recalls
that, present at that meeting on Mr. Nielsen's behalf were Mr. Nielsen, Steve Ross, who
15

was Mr. Nielsen's project manager, and Robert Stoelbarger, who was Mr. Nielsen's
lawyer, on behalf of MacDonald were MacDonald, a brother of MacDonald, Steve
Wood, who was MacDonald's California lawyer, Thomas Billings, who was MacDonald's
Utah lawyer and the three arbitrators, James R. Holbrook, Alan Funk and Philip Cook.
During Mr. Holbrook's explanation of the Panel's reasoning and intent, Mr. Wood said:
"What about my client's $60,000 personal loan to Nielsen?" Mr. Holbrook responded by
clarifying the Panel's intent in handling the loan: "That was included in the 40/60 split [of
equity]." Nielsen Aff. atfl 14, R. 59-60.
Mr. Nielsen understood MacDonald to have agreed that the loan subject of this
action was part and parcel of the arbitration, MacDonald's conduct in the arbitration and
his lawyer's question to the Panel evidenced MacDonald's own knowledge that such
loan had been accounted for in the dissolution of RDC and Mr. Nielsen relied on the
impression that Mr. Nielsen received from MacDonald during the entirety of the
arbitration proceeding that such loan was being resolved as part of the dissolution when
Mr. Nielsen formulated and proposed the "baseball" arbitration proposal that was
adopted by the Panel as their Award. Id. While the trial court is correct that entities
owned by Mr. Nielsen and MacDonald were the parties to the arbitration, and not them
personally, that observation does not alter the understanding Mr. Nielsen had of the
agreement to "recast" the "personal" obligation at the time of Mr. Gaskill's departure
from RDC to an RDC obligation. The fact that Mr. Nielsen's affidavit says he drafted
the Baseball Arbitration Proposal with that in mind supports that and raises the question
for resolution by the trier of fact.
Taking into consideration the relationship of the parties, the purpose of the loan,
the reason that MacDonald expressed his desire that it be considered "personal" while
16

Mr. Gaskill was present in RDC, the departure of Mr. Gaskill that Mr. Nielsen
understood would result in the "recasting," the fact that RDC received the benefit of all
the proceeds of the loan and MacDonald's motives to oust Nielsen's company from
RDC after Mr. Gaskill's departure, sufficient facts exist to allow a trier of fact to
conclude that the understanding was that the "recasting" referenced would be the
acknowledgment that the loan was a debt of RDC upon Mr. Gaskill's departure, that,
consistent with that understanding it was incorporated into the Baseball Arbitration
Proposal by Mr. Nielsen and that it was fully satisfied by the arbitration panel's award
adopting Mr. Nielsen's Baseball Arbitration Proposal to divide the RDC assets.
It is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether
Nielsen in fact received any consideration for which he agreed to pay or whether
MacDonald always intended the consideration to go to RDC and to use the written
memorandum as some sort of diversion to use with respect to Mr. Gaskill. See
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, by and Through First Security Bank, 764 P.2d 628, 634
(Utah 1988) ("Therefore, the underlying claims on which an account stated is based
must contain the basic elements of a contract, including consideration.") Also, there is a
fact question as to whether that part of the consideration that called for a "recasting"
failed? See id. at 632 n. 4.
It is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether MRI, by its
participation in the arbitration proceeding, intended to waive,3 elect remedies4 or
3

See In the Matter of the Discipline of Alex, 2004 UT 81 U 21, 99 P.3d 865, 869 ("To
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.")
4

See Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979)("The
doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to
(continued...)
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otherwise to resolve the indebtedness to MRI, now at issue in this case, but which was
in fact owed by RDC, another party to the arbitration. It is likewise clear that if the loan
at issue in this case was resolved through MRI's participation in the arbitration, and it
would seem difficult to conclude it was not, since all liabilities of RDC were taken into
account in the arbitration and Mr. Holbrook expressed that the debt was specifically
taken into account to determine the equity percentages between MRI and NR, that
genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the defenses of claim preclusion,
issue preclusion and arbitration and award, and that RDC, as a mutual party to the
arbitration, would be a necessary party to such determination, since Nielsen has
testified that the debt was agreed by MacDonald to really be RDC's and not Nielsen's.
Otherwise, RDC would be subject to potentially multiple or inconsistent obligations as
between claims of Nielsen or MacDonald that its debt had not ben resolved by the
Award.
MRI's asserted position in the arbitration, that the dissolution, accounting,
satisfaction of RDC liabilities and winding up of RDC and distribution of its assets and
liabilities, would end internal disagreements at RDC raises an issue of fact about
whether the parties to the arbitration intended the Award to have preclusive effect in
later proceedings. Nielsen clearly so intended. By not asserting otherwise when asking
about how the Panel incorporated the loan into its Award, a genuine issue of material
fact is raised about whether MacDonald also so intended.

4

(...continued)
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said
doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable
selection of one thereof, free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy
evincing a purpose to forego all others.
18

CONCLUSION

The record clearly contains facts which raise issues of material fact which
preclude summary judgment. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this

l ^ r a a y of September, 2006.
^
/

PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
A Professional Corporation

DAVID W. SCOFIELD

Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellant
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R. L. Knuth
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Addendum:
Ruling and Order,
dated January 10, 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIRKPATRICK MACDONALD,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040500403
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
MICHAEL NIELSEN,
Defendant.

DATE: January 10, 2006

The above matter came before the court on January 9, 2006,
for oral argument on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was present with James S. Lowrie and Ryan M. Harris and
defendant was not present in person or with counsel.

At

the appointed hour for argument the court had its
clerk call counsel for defendant, and the court clerk received a
voice message that Mr. Scofield was not in the office. Plaintiff
was present and had traveled from New York for the argument.

The

court heard argument from plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed this motion on June 2, 2005.

Defendant

filed an opposition response on July 14, 2005. Plaintiff filed a
reply on August 8, 2005.

A notice to submit was filed by

Plaintiff on August 8, 2005.

For some reason, presumably that a

new clerk at that time received and docketed the notice, that
notice was not ever brought to the attention of the court. That
error is regretted and the court apologizes for the delay that
error has caused.
December 14, 2005.

Plaintiff filed a renewed request to submit on
The same clerk, presumably now better

UuJ3u9

trained, provided that renewed notice to the court on that date.
Plaintiff requested oral argument. Oral argument was scheduled
and held January 9, 2006, as noted without defendant's presence.
The court took the matter under advisement.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the
entire file, heard oral argument from plaintiff, and concludes as
follows.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 4, 2005.

It alleged that

on April 23, 1998, plaintiff loaned $60,000 to defendant,
interest free for one year then if not repaid, accumulating at
10%. Notice was given to defendant and no payment has been made.
Causes of action are alleged for (1) breach of loan agreement;
and (2) unjust enrichment.
On March 16, 2005, defendant filed an answer and denied the
essential allegations and raised various affirmative defenses.
This motion followed.

ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff claims as undisputed facts that plaintiff, through
a partnership he controls, Macdonald Redhawk Investors, made a
personal loan to defendant on April 23, 1998.

That was evidenced
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by a letter initialed by defendant.

The terms were that it was a

personal loan to defendant, for one year interest free if repaid,
and 10% simple interest if not paid within one year.

On July 13,

1999, after the one year term, plaintiff asked defendant to repay
the loan and defendant refused.
In opposition to this rather simple appearing motion,
defendant has filed voluminous attachments.

Defendant claims

this loan was part of a long, complex relationship and that the
loan was to an entity in which plaintiff had an interest, and
that any disputes were resolved in an arbitration proceeding.
Defendant asserts that the letter-agreement notes that the
purpose of the loan was to pay vendors, for debts of Redhawk
Development, and that MacDonald Redhawk Investors was a member of
Redhawk Development.

The loan was not for Nielsen personally but

was to pay debts of Redhawk Development.
Defendant urges also that his initialing the agreement was
so the files of plaintiff would show the intent, but the real
interest of the parties was that the loan would be repaid by or
through Redhawk Development, and the letter's language (the loan
may be "recast") demonstrates that.
Defendant also disputes that he received the demand letter.
Defendant also disputes the claim the loan was not repaid.
The loan was satisfied through the dissolution and the accounting
in the arbitration.
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Defendant also claims there are other facts in dispute and
those include as noted that this transaction was part of a larger
agreement concerning a development in Summit County.

Plaintiff

is a partner in MacDonald Redhawk Investors, which is a member of
Redhawk Development, a Utah LLC, and each is a plaintiff in
another action in this court, docket no. 050500229.

In that case

it is asserted an arbitration panel divided property and
dissolved Redhawk Development. That arbitration is said to have
divided the project between them. The property was split based on
financial considerations and the equity interests of the parties.
At the time of this loan plaintiff and Gaskill, an investor
in Redhawk Investors, in turn an investor in Redhawk
Management, in turn an investor in Redhawk Development, were in a
dispute and so the understanding between plaintiff and defendant
in this loan was that defendant would advance the funds to the
benefit of Redhawk Development, thus creating a creditor
relationship with Redhawk Development, and when Gaskill was not
involved further, the loan would be reworked ("recast") depending
on how things developed. After Gaskill left disagreements
developed between plaintiff and defendant.
The understanding of the arbitration was that this loan
would be included, and paid from the Redhawk Development
dissolution since it was a debt of Redhawk Development to
defendant, to be repaid to plaintiff. The money should have been
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booked as a liability of Redhawk Development and should have, and
defendant believes was, considered by the arbitration panel in
its equity determination. Defendant believes the loan was
discussed after arbitration and was said by one of the panel to
have been included in the equity split of the arbitration panel.
Arbitration resolved all issues concerning Redhawk
Development, including this loan as part of the winding up of
that entity.
Defendant argues there are issues of material fact based on
the above disputes, supported by his affidavit and the
attachments concerning the arbitration, and voluminous email
messages relating to various topics. The issues of fact are said
to be whether defendant received any consideration, whether the
"recasting" failed, and whether MacDonald Redhawk Investors
waived or has elected other remedies concerning

this claim

because it participated in arbitration.
In reply plaintiff again asserts this is a simple, clear
personal loan.

Specifically, as to the arbitration proposal

adopted by the arbitration panel, it did not resolve all assets
and liability disagreements of Redhawk Development, but only the
real property and related debt. Plaintiff claims that defendant's
assertion that he, defendant, considered this loan in proposing
the "baseball" plan is incorrect as plaintiff and defendant
personally were not a part of the arbitration panel's decision.
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Plaintiff also disputes that defendant did not receive the
proceeds of the loan, as defendant received the proceeds and gave
the funds to Red Hawk Management, an entity in which plaintiff
had no interest, in order to match a contribution by other
members of Red Hawk Management. Plaintiff disputes defendant's
impressions and inferences and understandings.
Plaintiff asserts additional facts he claims are necessary
to the motion.

Those include that in April, 1998, the time of

the loan, Redhawk Development was owned 87.5% by Redhawk
Management and 12.5% by MacDonald Redhawk Investors.

Redhawk

Management was owned 50% by defendant and 50% by Gillette and
Gaskill.
Plaintiff claims the loan is on its face a clear and
unambiguous personal loan, and no parol evidence is needed nor
allowed as there is no ambiguity in the document. The loan was
never "recast" and so any "recasting" was no more than an
agreement to agree, it was not a part of the agreement. The loan
was not part of the arbitration.

DISCUSSION
The standard for summary judgment is well known.

A genuine

issue of material fact that is in dispute defeats summary
judgment and all inferences are drawn against the movant,
plaintiff herein.
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On its face a portion of this letter agreement is clear, but
as a whole it is less clear. The task of the court is to
determine if the entire note is ambiguous such that parol
evidence ought to be considered.

Clearly there were other

dealings surrounding this note, as shown by the note itself. If
the note is ambiguous, a party to a contract may be heard as to
the intent of the parties.
ambiguous.

The court does not find this letter

Parts of it are completely unambiguous, (date,

interest, time for repayment) but other parts render the entire
letter less unambiguous.

Still, the intent of the parties must

be determined from the note and the court believes that can be
done.
There are no genuine disputes about whether this loan was
part of the arbitration.

Defendant has attempted to cast

the arbitration as a forum where this dispute was
resolved.

Defendant cites to plaintiff's question, which

question most assuredly is not hearsay, to the effect he asked
about the loan.

The answer by a member of the panel (the loan

was considered) is argued to be hearsay and should not be
considered by the court.

The answer is not received for the

truth of the statement, but for its effect on the listener,
plaintiff.

Defendant was not a party to the arbitration but

entities were, and the court finds no genuine dispute about
whether all debts and liabilities were considered in arbitration.
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They were not. Thus, there is no dispute about whether the
arbitration considered the loan. Even if the court accepts the
statement of the arbitrator, for its effect on the listener, the
parties were entities, and so "considering" the loan does not
make a genuine issue of fact out of the equitable division of
real property.

The court is not now about to resolve the other

case concerning arbitration and is not resolving whether the loan
was "considered" in that arbitration.

The court is merely

indicating that is one area of dispute that is not genuine.
Another example of what defendant claims is a dispute is
whether defendant received the proceeds personally or whether he
put them to use for the benefit of himself, his entities (Redhawk
Management) or for the benefit of plaintiff or one of his
entities.

Again, the court does not view that as material given

the structure of this note.

Whether a demand letter was received

or not is in dispute, but it is not material as this lawsuit
serves as a demand.
The court is not resolving the disputes between the parties,
concerning this loan and its interplay with other aspects of
their dealings. The court is merely ruling that concerning this
note, the court believes there are no disputed issues of material
fact that defeat summary judgment.

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.
DATED this /&

day of_jV_^£f£_, 2006.
BY THE COURT

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^8gSr8Er<
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Case No: 040500403
Date:
Jan 10, 2006
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040500403 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail
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Dated t h i s

If) {j&siy of

NAME
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ATTORNEY PLA
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Addendum:
Judgment,
dated January 24, 2006

2006 JAN 2i* ANrfrSS
lUOMw.

James S. Lowrie (USB #2007)
RL.Knuth (USB #3625)
RyanM, Harris (USB #8192)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
ICJRKPATRICKMACDONALD,an
individual,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
MICHAEL NIELSEN, an individual,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 040500403
Judge Bruce C. Luheck

Defendant.

Pursuant to this Court's Ruling and Order dated January 10, 2006, in which this Court granted
summary judgment to the Plaintiff, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Judgment is hereby entered hi favor of the PlaintiffKirkpatriclc MacDonald and against the

Defendant Michael Nielsen in the amount of $100.304.66 (including 560.000.00 ofnrincipal and $40.3 04.66
of interest since April 23,1999). Post-judgment interest shall accrue at the statutory rate, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §15-1-4.

727153V2

DATED this ^

day of J ^

AJJL

&>,,, ,

2 QQ 6 ,

BY THE COURT:

Bruce C. Lubeck
Third District Court Judge

727153v2
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Addendum:
Ruling and Order,
dated June 2, 2006

I©ffi21ira
JUN - 5 2005
$\

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI3TRIct_C0URT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIRKPATRICK MACDONALD, an
individual

RULING and ORDER

Plaintiff,

Case No.

040500403

vs.
Date: June 2, 2006
MICHAEL NIELSEN, an
individual

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

Defendant.
The above matter came before the Court for oral
argument on May 31, 2006 on Defendant Michael Nielsen's
(Nielsen] Motion to Allow Third Party Complaint.

Plaintiff

Kirkpatrick MacDonald (MacDonald) was present through James
S. Lowrie and Ryan M. Harris.

Defendant was present through

David W. Scofield.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 4, 2005.

It alleged

that on April 23, 1998, Plaintiff loaned $60,000 to
Defendant, interest free for one year then if not repaid,
accumulating at 10%. Notice was given to Defendant and no
payment was made.

Causes of action were alleged for (1)

breach of loan agreement; and (2) unjust enrichment.
On March 16, 2005, Defendant filed an answer and denied

the essential allegations and raised various affirmative
defenses.
Counsel for the parties discussed and agreed upon a
discovery plan and scheduling order which Plaintiff s
counsel prepared and sent to Defendant's counsel.
Defendant's counsel never signed the agreement, nor did he
follow its deadlines. According to the plan, initial
disclosures were to be sent May 27, 2005 and the last day
for joining additional parties or amending pleadings was
July 8, 2005.

Defendant never sent initial disclosures to

Plaintiff.
A motion for summary judgment was filed by Plaintiff
June 2, 2005.
July 14, 2005.

Defendant filed an opposition response on
Plaintiff filed a reply August 8, 2005, as

well as a notice to submit. A clerical error was made and
the Court did not receive notice of the request to submit.
Plaintiff filed a renewed request to submit on December 14,
2005.

Oral argument was scheduled and heard on January 9,

2006.

Plaintiff was present, but neither Defendant nor his

attorney were present.
day.

Oral arguments proceeded on that

On January 10, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment.

The Court found the letter
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initialed by Defendant evidencing a personal loan from
MacDonald Redhawk Investors, a partnership MacDonald
controls, was unambiguous on its face prohibiting the Court
from considering parol evidence. The Cou^t found there were
no genuine disputes of fact that were material and proceeded
to say it was ""not resolving the disputes between the
parties, concerning this loan and its interplay with other
aspects of their dealings"" which are the subject of another
proceeding in this Court, docket number 050500229.
After summary judgment was granted, Defendant on
January 19, 2006, filed a motion to allow third-party
complaint.

Plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing

Defendant's motion on January 30, 2006.

On February 7,

2006, Defendant filed a reply memorandum.

A request to

submit for decision was filed February 10, 2006.

Oral

arguments were set for March 27, 2006, then continued at the
request of the parties until May 31, 2006.
A notice of appeal was filed by defendant February 22,
2006, and on April 28, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals
temporarily remanded the case for consideration of this
motion.
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ARGUMENTS
Defendant requests that the Court grant leave to file a
third-party complaint after summary judgment has been
granted for Plaintiff in this case.

Defendant claims Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) authorizes a defendant to
serve a summons and complaint against a third-party at any
time after commencement of the original action.

If the

defendant seeks to file a third-party complaint after 10
days of filing his answer, he must receive leave from the
court.

It is at the discretion of the trial court to grant

or deny leave to file third-party complaint.

The Defendant

claims that, in light of the Court's ruling on summary
judgment, he has third-party claims against Redhawk
Development Company (Redhawk Development) because Redhawk
Development received the full benefit of the loan to Neilsen
but Redhawk Development has not repaid Nielsen.

Redhawk

Development has been dissolved, but MacDonald Redhawk
Investors is liable for 60% of the unsecured liabilities of
Redhawk Development under a previous arbitration agreement.
(The entities controlled by or owned by the parties involved
in this case participated in arbitration proceedings and are
subject to the resulting arbitration agreement).
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The

Defendant claims that liability against the non-party who
received the actual benefit of the loan should be
established in the same proceeding as the liability on the
loan itself because it would protect the Defendant from
inconsistent positions that might be asserted if the thirdparty complaint was a separate action.

The Defendant also

claims allowing the third-party complaint to proceed would
not be unjustly prejudicial to the Plaintiff, because the
new parties would not raise defenses to Plaintiff's note
claim that could jeopardize the summary judgment plaintiff
received.

The single issue in the third-party complaint is

whether Redhawk Development, and, hence, MacDonald Redhawk
Investors, are liable to Nielsen for his debt to Plaintiff.
Defendant also argued judicial economy as even if this
motion is denied, defendant may file an independent action
seeking the same relief.

The Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion. The
Plaintiff claims the case is over, the motion is untimely,
and the motion is without merit.
The Plaintiff claims the motion is untimely for several
reasons.

First, the Defendant knew of his claims against
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the third parties as evidenced by the statements he
affirmatively alleged in his Answer and in his affidavit in
opposition to the summary judgment motion of plaintiff.
Specifically, the Defendant claimed that "MacDonald's claims
are barred by MacDonald's failure to join indispensable
parties//' the claims are barred "in whole or in part, due to
the payment of any alleged sums to his own partnership,
limited liability company, or other co-venture," and "the
issues raised in MacDonald' s Complaint were submitted to
binding arbitration and that the arbitration panel has
exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, and that such panel
of arbitrators fully resolved the issues in this dispute
when making and entering the arbitration award."

These

statements show the Defendant always knew of his claims
against third-parties and should have asserted them within
the ten days after he filed his Answer or, at least, before
July 8, 2005 according to the terms of the discovery
schedule and plan.

Second, this motion was filed late in

the litigation, nine months after the Complaint was filed
and after summary judgment disposed of the case, and without
adequate justification.

In fact, Plaintiff points out the

Defendant has given no reason for filing the motion at such
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a late date.
The Plaintiff claims the third-party complaint is
without merit and futile because Nielsen used the proceeds
of the personal loan as a capital contribution in Redhawk
Management LLC, and, therefore, it is immaterial that
Redhawk Management used the money to pay off debts of
Redhawk Development.

Nielsen owned 50% of Redhawk

Management and to maintain his 50% ownership position after
a capital call he had to contribute an amount equal to what
the other owners contributed, which in this case was
$60,000.

The loan was used to invest in Redhawk Management.

If a person makes an investment in a corporation in exchange
for stock, and the value of that stock drops, the person
(absent securities fraud) cannot recoup any of his losses.
The third-party entities are not liable to Nielsen because
he lost his investment.

The Plaintiff also claims the

Defendant has not identified a precise cause of action in
his proposed third-party complaint because there is none.
Plaintiff claims prejudice in protracted litigation and
asserts that if untimely and futile and without
justification, the motion should be denied without respect
to any prejudice to plaintiff.
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In reply to Plaintiffs opposition, Defendant points
out Plaintiff failed to addr-ess the procedural grounds for
the motion.

Plaintiff never claimed that he will be

prejudiced by allowing the third-party complaint to go
forward only that Defendant didn't abide by the terms of an
unsigned schedule.

Defendant claims there was good reason

for not signing the schedule or abiding by its terms.
Namely, numerous documents had to be filed in the
arbitration case in response to Plaintiffs tactics starting
May 12, 2005, which occupied the Defendant and were finally
resolved May 31, 2005.

Two days later, on June 2, 2005,

Plaintiff filed his "early motion for summary judgment in
this case completely changing the landscape of the case
insofar as scheduling was concerned.

The Defendant claims

now that this Court determined the existence of a debt
between Plaintiff and Defendant, which was not part of the
arbitration award entered between the entities controlled or
owned by the parties herein as Defendant had claimed, it now
makes sense to assert a third-party action against the
entity that received the benefit of the money, Redhawk
Development and the party responsible for 60% of its debts,
MacDonald Redhawk Investors. Had the Court determined the
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debt had been resolved in the arbitration award, there would
be no debt to claim against the third-parties.

Defendant

further claims the cases Plaintiff cites to support a denial
of Defendant's motion for untimeliness are unique and
factually different from the case at hand because allowing
an amendment in those cases would have been prejudicial to
the non-movant. Here Plaintiff has not claimed prejudice.
Defendant claims granting his motion will support judicial
economy as well.
The Defendant also addressed Plaintiff's claim that a
third-party complaint is futile.

Defendant claims its

proposed pleadings are adequate and put the third-parties on
notice of the claims against them.

In the proposed

pleadings, Defendant asserted that Redhawk Development
received the benefit of the loan proceeds from Nielsen with
the reasonable expectation by Nielsen that Redhawk
Development would repay Nielsen but Redhawk Development has
instead retained the benefit and not repaid Nielsen under
inequitable circumstances.

The Defendant claims he is a

creditor of Redhawk Development and has the rights
accompanying the class of all creditors holding unsecured
liabilities and as a third-party beneficiary of the
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a r b i t r a t i o n award Defendant has a claim a g a i n s t MacDonald
Redhawk I n v e s t o r s .

DISCUSSION
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) states, "At any time
after commencement of the action a defendant . . . may cause
a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." A defendant
must receive leave from the court to file a third-party
complaint after ten days have passed from when the filing of
an answer. A motion under Rule 14(a) is similar, but not
identical, to a motion to amend the pleadings made under.
Rule 15. "The granting or denying of leave to amend a
pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court.
. . . According to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which
permits the amendment of pleadings by leave of courtr leave
is to be ^freely given when justice so requires.' In
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend, three
factors are relevant: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2)
the moving party's reason for the delay; and (3) the
resulting prejudice to the responding party."
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Mountain

America Credit

Union v. McClellan,

854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah

1993)(citations omitted)(affirming trial court's decision to
deny leave to file a third-party complaint, where the motion
seeking leave was filed nearly two years after the filing of
the answer and a year and a half after the Court had granted
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings).

The

Court will address each factor in turn.
First, the Court must consider whether the motion was
timely filed.

Defendant's motion was filed nine months

after he filed his answer with the Court, but it was filed
only 13 days after the Court granted Plaintiff s motion for
summary judgment.

The Court was delayed in considering the

motion for summary judgment due to clerical error.

A

request to submit the motion for summary judgment was
originally filed August 8, 2005, and was renewed December
14, 2005.

The motion for summary judgment was filed very

early in the case, June 2, 2005. All things considered, the
Court finds the motion to allow third-party complaint was
timely filed.
The Court must next consider whether Defendant's
reasons for the delay justify granting his motion.

The

Defendant claims there were pressing matters in the related
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arbitration action that required immediate attention which
took precedent over this action, but more importantly,
Plaintiff s early filing of a motion for summary judgment
changed the nature of the proceedings.

The Court agrees

that the Defendant could have filed his motion at an earlier
date, and the rules normally are better served when a third
party complaint is filed more timely. It does appear, as
plaintiff argued, that defendant made a strategic decision
to attempt to prevail on the summary judgment motion but
failed, and now defendant desires to have a third party
defendant in the case.

However, the court does conclude

that the early filing of the motion for summary judgment did
change the proceedings and the delay is not fatal to
defendant's motion now.
Finally, the Court must consider whether the Plaintiff
will be prejudiced by granting Defendant's motion, which is
the most important of all the factors. The Plaintiff did
not argue that he would be prejudiced other than by the
increased cost of litigation, but the Court concludes that
legally that is not prejudice sufficient to defeat this
proposed filing.

The third-parties are unlikely to

challenge the validity of the loan and its existence.
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Instead, the third-parties will only challenge whether or
not they are liable for all or part of its repayment.
Either way, the Plaintiff will be repaid.
Further, defendant is certainly entitled to bring this
as an independent action, and it seems on balance that in
the context of this case that all parties and the court will
be better served economically if this motion is granted
rather than denied and defendant brings a new action.
For the above reasons, the Court finds Defendant's
motion was timely filed and should be allowed.
Plaintiffs contends the motion should be denied
because the claim is without merit and the pleadings are
insufficient. In Smith, v. Grand Canyon Expeditions

Co.,

the

Utah Supreme Court considered whether Smith should have been
allowed to amend his complaint. The Court said:
v

We have previously noted that rule 8©), U.R.C.P.,
requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a
good rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be
tried clearly framed. But it is not the only rule in
the book of Rules of Civil Procedure. They must all be
looked to in the light of their even more fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to
the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have
pertaining to their dispute. What they are entitled to
is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to
meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that
is required. Our rules provide for liberality to allow
examination into and settlement of all issues bearing
-13-

upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the
other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new
issue if he so requests." Smith v. Grand Canyon
Expeditions
Co., 2003 UT 57, 112.
Also a party may not amend a complaint to add a cause of
action that is legally insufficient, Smith,

2003 UT at 133,

The Court finds the language quoted above persuasive.

The

Court finds Defendant's third-party complaint is legally
sufficient and meets the pleading requirements of Rule 8.
The pleading rules in Utah are liberal and, although
Defendant's complaint does not specifically allege a cause
of action, it does put the third-party defendants on notice
of the claims against them. The third-party complaint is not
futile at this point.

The Defendant may not be able to

prove that the loan to him was then a loan to Redhawk
Development instead of an investment or that the money
should be repaid to him on some other ground, but the thirdparty complaint is at most only at the pleading stage and
Defendant should be given the opportunity to prove his case.
The issues can be more fully developed through further
proceedings.

As the matter was temporarily remanded to this court
from the Utah Court of Appeals, the court believes it is
-14-

prudent to note that in the view of this court the previous
ruling granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is a
final judgment under URCP, Rule 54(b) and there is no just
reason for delay and judgment should be issued.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no
other order is required.

Dated this

H^

day of //[/^-{'

2006.

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Third District Court Ju£
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